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Book Review: Political Struggles and the Forging of
Autonomous Government Agencies
The central argument of Political Struggles and the Forging of Autonomous Government
Agencies is that the level of autonomy of government agencies is the outcome of struggles
between opposing coalitions. Cristopher Ballinas Valdes aims to show how political struggles
between politicians and bureaucrats often generate a muddle of agencies that lack coherence
and are subject to different and conflicting levels of political control. A must-read for academics
and reformers interested in Mexican economic institutions, writes Julián Daniel López-
Murcia.
Polit ical Struggles and the Forging of Autonomous Government
Agencies. Cristopher Ballinas Valdés. Palgrave Macmillan. June
2013.
Find this book:  
“Sacred cows no more” was the tit le used by The Economist to discuss
the regulatory ref orm proposed by Mexican President Peña Nieto to deal
with the unsatisf actory perf ormance of  the country’s telecoms markets,
currently dominated by Carlos Slim – the world’s richest man – and Emilio
Azcárraga, the boss of  Televisa, a private television network. For The
Economist there seems to be a clear path towards an optimal regulatory
ref orm in Mexico, given that the creation of  a new autonomous
government agency with the powers to respond to the current market
f ailures is also supported by the opposition parties. However, this book
written by Cristopher Ballinas, Associate Prof essor of  the ITAM (Mexico),
clearly contends that this type of  analysis – f ocused only on the reasons
to create an autonomous agency, technical designs and the role of
polit icians – neglects the crit ical impact of  the polit ical struggles between
bureaucratic and polit ical actors on the conf iguration of  these agencies.
Why is it that the structure and degree of  autonomy in autonomous government agencies
varies across issue areas and over t ime? Ballinas argues that this is because these
agencies are not the result of  systematic design, but of  polit ical struggles between bureaucratic
and polit ical actors, who try to shape them in their own interest. He also crit iques f ormal- legal
approaches to the concept of  autonomy. In this way, the signif icant variation between the degrees of  actual
autonomy among these agencies could be explained through the examination of  these interactions. To this
end, Ballinas develops a model based on institutional economics, game theory and network bureaucratic
analysis. Particularly, he sketches the amplif ied version of  the game, and then breaks it into three of  its
relevant sub-games: non-creation of  an agency, co-operative creation of  an agency, and a non-co-
operative creation of  an agency. And he tests his hypothesis in three case studies in Mexico: the central
bank, telecommunications and energy sectors.
The recent telecommunications ref orm in Mexico immediately attracted my attention to Ballinas’ work on
this sector. Ballinas also points out that, theoretically, this is “by f ar the most interesting case”. In the early
1990s, the decision to privatize Telmex, the government-owned telecommunications monopoly, as a
vertically integrated f irm maintained its market power. The company’s control remained in Mexican hands
and policymakers intentionally neglected the role of  regulation in order to f acilitate the emergence of  a
powerf ul Mexican business class with litt le competit ion. By the end of  the 1990s, the conf iguration of  the
regulatory agency produced two groups inside the government that were in open conf lict: the experienced
public of f icials of  the sector; and the ref orm team, which was backed by members of  Congress and
stakeholders. The f ormer group understood that the best way to avoid the regulatory capture would be to
set the agency under the supervision of  the ministry, and the latter believed that the best option would be a
decentralized organisation. The result was a combination of  dissimilar institutional pref erences “coming
f rom two groups in conf lict who changed or reinf orced their posit ions and modif ied their strategies,
resulting in a rather amorphous, nebulous design”. The struggles between la Comisión Federal de
Telecomunicaciones (COFETEL) and the ministry resulted in the f ailure to produce basic regulatory
resolutions. Similarly, the dif f icult relationship between COFETEL and other incumbent bodies (such as the
anti- trust commission) impeded agreement on several issues, which had to be f inally decided by the courts.
In such an environment, “Telmex enjoyed a long period without substantive competit ion and proper
regulation”.
Ballinas’ model f or testing the causal ef f ect of  bureaucrats’ polit ical action on the conf iguration of  an
autonomous government agency is an interesting theoretical contribution beyond the dominant approaches
in this literature. From the tradit ional principal-agent perspective, as Gilardi states, the f actors that
determine the design of  an agency are the government’s interests in proving its credible commitment and
getting blame avoidance regarding unpopular decisions, as well as in transf erring complex issues (Thatcher
and Stone). And as McNollgast explains, once these agencies are created, they are controlled through
“police patrols” (constant monitoring), “f ire alarms” activated by af f ected constituencies, and administrative
procedures. From the notion of  institutional isomorphism, the structures of  these agencies are merely the
product of  dif f erent types of  resembling processes (coercive, mimetic or normative). Alternatively, as
Thatcher explains, some historical approaches have highlighted the relevance of  domestic polit ical
conditions in the emergence of  autonomous agencies. However, much of  the variation in the degrees of
autonomy of  these agencies is lef t unexplained by these conventional approaches. In such an environment,
the model developed by Ballinas is a signif icant contribution that helps to address this crit ical f actor.
On the other hand, despite this innovative model, the book is still based on the hegemonic idea that the
responsiveness of  the regulation is directly associated with the agency’s level of  autonomy. Nonetheless,
as authors like Black and Scott contend, this type of  centralized understanding of  regulation is distant f rom
reality. In the regulatory space, diverse public and private actors share the regulatory authority (Capitalism,
Culture and Economic Regulation by Hancher and Moran). Moreover, as Prosser explains in his book The
Regulatory Enterprise: Government, Regulation, and Legitimacy, the agencies’ autonomy should not be the
key principle of  institutional design, because regulation is a collaborative enterprise between regulatory
agencies and other government bodies in the regulatory space. Regulation is not an isolated crusade by
the regulatory agency. In f act, an alternative interpretation of  the Mexican telecommunications case is that
this is not necessarily a problem of  lack of  agency’s autonomy, but of  limited communication and
coordination between government bodies.
In sum, Ballinas’ book is a must-read not only f or academics and ref ormers interested in Mexican economic
institutions (in f act, at this t ime, Mexico is also ref orming its energy sector), but in any country with a
strong bureaucracy. His model is not only relevant because of  its explanatory value regarding the variation
in the degrees of  autonomy of  the autonomous government agencies around the world, but as a good
example of  the cutting edge scholarship currently produced by Latin American scholars, to some extent,
beyond the domestic application of  the American and European theories on regulation. Still, the readers of
this book should not f orget that, as Colin Scott argues, a ref orm might not be f ocus on a single
organization - the agency- but rather on the entire conf iguration of  resources and relations within the
regulatory space.
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